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Comments
LESSOR'S LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
The liability of the lessor in Louisiana for personal injuries
to the tenant or third persons caused by the defective condition
of the premises is in marked contrast to liability at common law.
Under common law principles the landlord enjoys a virtual im-
munity. His liability is dependent upon the fact that at the time
the lease was entered into he knew of defects which he was aware
the lessee could not discover for himself. In brief the landlord
owes the tenant only the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
[406]
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On the other hand, the liability of the lessor in Louisiana
is based on Article 2695,1 which reads as follows:
"The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and
defects of the thing, which may prevent its being used even
in case it should appear he knew nothing of the existence
of such vices and defects, at the time the lease was made, and
even if they have arisen since, provided they do not arise
from the fault of the lessee; and if any loss should result to
the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound
to indemnify him for the same."
This article was adopted from Article 1721 of the French
Civil Code. As this article originally appeared in Pothier's
treatise the lessor guaranteed the lessee against all vices and de-
fects of the thing which might prevent its being used entirely.2
Under this view it seems clear that it was not intended that there
be recovery for personal injuries to the tenant or others. Al-
though the word "entirely" was deleted when this was adopted
as Article 1721 of the French Civil Code, it still appears that there
was no intent to create a cause of action when the thing leased
is capable of being used for its intended purpose although it
contains a defect which might result in physical injury. The
reasonable interpretation, therefore, is that the purpose of the
article was merely to assure the lessee against a disadvantageous
lease and permit him to avoid the contract or to secure damages
which would compensate him for his loss of bargain. This view
is fortified by the general position of the French law that liability
for injury (responsibilit6) is dependent on the existence of fault.
The notion of guaranty expressed in Article 17213 is inconsistent
with this basic position. For that reason the commentators have
generally expressed disapproval of the use of the article for conse-
quential damages to the person or property in cases when the
lessor was blameless.4 Nevertheless, the courts seem to have per-
mitted recovery for consequential damages without reference
to the fault of the lessor.*
1. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
2. 10 Planiol et Ripert, Traite Pratique de Droit Civil Francals (1932
ed.) 655, no 537.
3, French Civil Code, corresponding to Article 2695 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870.
4. 2 Planiol, Tralte Elementaire de Droit Civil (11 ed. 1937) 617, no 1689; 2
Colin et Capitant, Cours Elementaire de Droit Civil Francais (1935) 595,
no 654.
5. Req., 23 juin 1874, Sirey 75.1.120.
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The Louisiana courts have adopted the same position by
imposing on the lessor the obligation of keeping his building in
a safe condition. The result has been to impose absolute liability,
since the fact that the premises do contain defects is sufficient
proof that that he has not performed this duty. Several cases
illustrate that the court does not consider the reasonableness
of the defendant's conduct.6 In Badie v. Columbia Brewing Com-
pany,1 the plaintiff was injured a few hours after an inspection
by the lessor had revealed the defect. Since ignorance of the
defect itself would not relieve the defendant under Article 2695,8
the court rejected the defendant's plea that he be allowed a rea-
sonable time after the discovery in which to make the repairs.
Liability was based on a failure to maintain the premises in a
safe condition, but the court seemed to disregard the defendant's
efforts to discharge his duty. Other Louisiana decisions contain
similar language," although it is noteworthy that in most cases
in which such statements occur the courts would have been justi-
fied in finding negligence on the part of the landlord.
It is apparent that the notion of absolute liability cannot be
indiscriginately imposed on the landlord in each and every
instance for each and every defect. In many instances the defect
may be too trivial, or the conduct of the lessee may indicate that
he, rather than the lessor, is more appropriately chargeable with
the loss. Fair play often demands that the landlord be exonerated
from liability, and there thus arises a need for some means
whereby the situations can be individualized by the courts. Of
course the simplest and most easily administered device for this
purpose is the concept of negligence, or fault. But when, as with
the plight of the Louisiana landlord, fault is not available as a
means of mediation, other restrictions can be brought into play
to prevent unfairness.
One way of restricting liability is to impose disqualifications
on the plaintiff. The defective conditon may be regarded by the
court as one which the tenant, rather than the landlord, should
6. Wise v. Lavigne, 138 La. 218, 70 So. 103 (1915); W. J. Gayle and Co. v.
Atkins, 3 Or. App. 513 (1906); Kelly v. During, 6 La. App. 91 (1927); Byrd V.
Spiro, 170 So. 384 (La. App. 1936).
7. 142 La. 853, 77 So. 768 (1918). Alth: "gh a third party was involved
here the result would probably have been the same if the tenant had not
received warning of the defect and been injured.
8. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
9. Breen v. Walters, 150 La. 578, 91 So. 50 (1922); Davis v. Hochfelder,
153 La. 183, 95 So. 598 (1923).
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repair. Article 26P which gives the tenant the right to make
repairs and deduct the cost thereof, from the rent, has been
seized upon by the court as a basis for relieving the landlord of
liability. It int c',reted this article as imposing on the tenant
the duty of making necessary repairs at the landlord's expense,
and the tenant's failure to take the initiative was a defense
available to the landlord.1 ' In Brodtman v. Finerty"' the lessee
who had been injured by a defective hinge was denied a recovery
on the basis of this article. The court was obviously influenced
by the minor nature of the defect, and in justifying its decision
it drew a distinction between ordinary repairs and the serious
defects contemplated by Article 2695."3 Thus the court succeeded
in avoiding a complete commitment to the idea that where the
tenant can repair he must do so or lose his rights against the
landlord. The seriousness of the defect was made the touchstone
upon which recovery could be allowed or denied. For example in
Boutte v. New Orleans Terminal Company 4 the plaintiff sued
for personal injuries sustained when a rotten balustrade fell with
her. She was permitted to recover despite the defendant's re-
liance on the Brodtman case. The court emphasized the different
nature of the alleged defect in the two cases. Other decisions
illustrate the same tendency to regard the practical situation
attendant on the accident as of controlling importance. When the
tenant's goods were injured through persistent localized leakage
in the roof of the leased premises the court held that failure by
the tenant to repair precluded recovery. 5 It is clear that in such
a case means of alleviating the situation were at the easy dis-
posal of the tenant and that to permit recovery would violate
common ideas of fairness.
10. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870: "If the lessor do not make the neces-
sary repairs in the manner required in the preceding article, the lessee may
call on him to make them. If he refuse or neglect to make them, the lessee
may himself cause them to be made, and deduct the price from the rent
due, on proving that the repairs were indispensable, and that the price which
he has paid was just and reasonable."
11. Bianchi v. Del Valle, 117 La. 587, 42 So. 148 (1906); Singleton v. Singer,
13 Orl. App. 31 (1915).
12. 116 La. 1103, 41 So. 329 (1906).
13. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
14. 139 La. 945, 72 So. 513 (1916).
15. Scudder v. Paulding, 4 Rob. 428 (La. 1843); Westermeier v. Street,
21 La. Ann. 714 (1869); Pesant v. Heartt, 22 La. Ann. 292 (1870); Diggs v.
Maury, 23 La. Ann. 59 (1871); Winn v. Spearing, 26 La. Ann. 384 (1874);
Welharn v. Lingham, 28 La. Ann. 903 (1876). For a later case, however, in
which a recovery was allowed because damage was not caused by a con-
tinuing leak but an extra hard rain, see May v. Schepis, 147 So. 717 (La. App.
1933).
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However, the failure of the tenant to repair was urged with
increasing insistency by defendants and it soon became apparent
that the failure to repair by the tenant should not be recognized
as a reason to defeat recovery. As a result the interpretation of
Article 269416 as made in the Brodtman case was renounced. 17
Other means of precluding recovery for minor defects, however,
were still available to the court. For example, Article 271618
enumerates certain minor repairs which the tenant was required
to make for himself. There can be no recovery for injuries flow-
ing from these enumerated items.19 This, applies whether the
injury is to the tenant himself or to members of his family.2 ° The
result in most cases is the same as that accomplished by the
Brodtman decision since most of the trifling repairs which arise
to harass the court will fall into the enumerations of this article.
In one respect Article 271621 is more advantageous to the land-
lord than any other means of escaping liability for minor defects,
16. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
17. Frank v. Suthon, 159 Fed. 174 (E. D. La. 1908); Boutte v. New Orleans
Terminal Co., 139 La. 945, 72 So. 513 (1916); White v. Juge, 142 So. 851 (La.
App. 1932), affirmed 176 La. 1045, 147 So. 72 (1933); Landry v. Monteleone,
150 La. 546, 90 So. 919 (1922).
18. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870: "The repairs, which must be made at
the expense of the tenant, are those which, during the lease, it becomes
necessary to make:
"To the hearth, to the back of chimneys and chimney casing.
"To the plastering of the lower part of interior walls.
"To the pavement of rooms, when it is but partially broken, but not
when it is In a state of decay.
"For replacing window glass, when broken accidentally, but not when
broken either in whole or in their greatest part by a hail storm or by any
other inevitable accident.
"To windows, shutters, partitions, shop windows, locks and hinges, and
everything of that kind, according to the custom of the place."
19. Moore v. Aughey, 142 La. 1042, 78 So. 110 (1918) (defective door knob
caused plaintiff to fall); Hutchins v. Pick, 164 So. 173 (La. App. 1935) (hinge
on door facing). For cases wherein a recovery was permitted despite reli-
ance on this article see Herbert v. Herrlitz, 146 So. 65 (La. App. 1933) (land-
lord had assumed to make the repairs); Washington v. Rosen, 165 So. 473
(La. App. 1936) (iron sink breaking loose from the wall); Wilcox v. Lehman,
12 So. (2d) 641 (La. App. 1943) (slippery pavement due to leaky hydrant).
In view of the decision rendered in several cases it may be doubted that
the tenant would be obligated to repair where the defect was in existence
before the lease commenced. In Cornelio v. Viola, 161 So. 196 (La. App. 1935)
the court relied on Article 2693 to the effect that the lessor is bound to de-
liver in good condition in order to allow a recovery. See also Lowe v. Home
Owners' Loan Corp., 1 So. (2d) 362 (La. App. 1941), affirmed 119 La. 672, 6 So.
(2d) 726 (1942); Tesoro v. Abate, 173 So. 196 (La. App. 1937).
20. Harris v. Tennis, 149 La. 295, 88 So. 912 (1921); Douglas v. Pettit, 120
So. 793 (La. App. 1929); Tesoro v. Abate, 173 So. 196 (La. App. 1937); Farve
v. Danna, 181 So. 823 (La. App. 1938); Vignes v. Barbarra, 5 So.(2d) 656 (La.
App... 1942); Lowe v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 199 La. 672, 6 So.(2d) 726
(1942).
21. La. Civil Code of 1870.
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since under this article it is immaterial that the tenant was
ignorant of the defect."
Intimately connected with the obligation of the tenant to
repair and often disposed of in the same terms is the doctrine
of contributory negligence.2 Although the action by the tenant is
essentially one based on a guaranty, the defense of the tenant's
carelessness is sometimes made available to the landlord. It ap-
pears, however, that this defense is not one that may be assertel
against every tenant whose conduct might be subject to reproach.
Certainly the tenant is under no obligation to make an inspection
of the premises to determine their safety. Even though he is
aware that a portion is in a generally unsafe condition, if it ap-
pears that the portion can be used with reasonable care, the
tenant is not required to forego the benefits of occupancy.2'
only where the plaintiff's disregard of his own safety has been
Defective material is usually involved in these cases, and the
court has rarely allowed the doctrine to defeat recovery. It is
so shocking to the court that it feels the plaintiff invited disaster
that the doctrine has been applied to this type of defect.2 5 When,
however, the defect is obvious and at a determinable place and
when the danger of a mishap is imminently in the tenant's mind
the choice of encountering the risk usually precludes recovery.26
Similarly, a tenant who has placed the premises to an improper
use and has thereby imposed on the landlord a burden which he
could not reasonably be expected to meet will be denied re-
22. Moore v. Aughey, 142 La. 1042, 78 So. 110 (1918).
23. Ciaccio v. Carbajal, 145 La. 869, 83 So. 73 (1919); Plescia v. Le Roy,
148 La. 316, 86 So. 824 (1921) (plaintiff said to be without "fault" in failing
to make the repairs).
24. Pardee Co. v. Austin, 58 F.(2d) 967 (C.C.A. 5th, 1932); Boutte v. New
Orleans Terminal Co., 139 La. 945, 72 So. 513 (1916); Price v. Florsheim, 127
So. 22 (La. App. 1930); Thompson v. Moran, 19 La. App. 343, 140 So. 291
(1932); White v. Juge, 176 La. 1045, 147 So. 72 (1933); Labat v. Gaerthner
Realty Co., 146 So. 69 (La. App. 1933);' Chutz v. Bergeron, 147 So. 112 (La.
App. 1933); Estes v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 158 So. 25 (Ia. App.
1934); Thomas v. Catalanatto, 164 So. 171 (La. App. 1935); Thompson v.
Donald, 169 So. 242 (La. App. 1936); Danove v. Mahoney, 176 So. 404 (La. App.
1937).
25. Parker v. Kreber, 153 La. 191, 95 So. 601 (1923); Caulfield v. Saba, 144
So. 907 (La. App. 1932); Wright v. Jones, 193 So. 197 (La. App. 1939); Redd
v. Sokoloski, 2 So. (2d) 266 (La. App. 1941).
26. Torres v. Starke, 132 La. 1045, 62 So. 137 (1913) (hole in the floor);
Richard v. Tarantino, 131 So. 701 (La. App. 1931) (Court remanded to deter-
mine exactly under what conditions accident happened); Johnson v. Lucy
Realty and Dev. Co., 187 So. 325 (La. App. 1939); Coulton v. Caruso, 195 So.
804 (La. App. 1940); Fontenot v. Angel, 2 So. (2d) 475 (La. App. 1941).
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covery. A landlord cannot be expected to construct a balcony
rail sufficiently strong that it can be ued in the raising or lower-
ing of furniture,28 nor to provide screans of such strength as will
protect an infant from the danger of a iall.29 in such casez it can
be said that the tenant is barred from recovery because of his
own misconduct, or that the premises were not in fact defective.30
Liability of the Owner to Third Persons
The guarantor's liab.lity under Article 269581 has generally
been restricted to the parties to the contract of lease.82 Although
the Louisiana decisions have not been too consistent on this point,
it has become current practice for all injured persons other than
the tenant to proceed against the landlord. under Article 2322,83
which reads as follows:
"The owner of a building is answerable for the damage oc-
casioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair
it, or when it is the result of a vice in its original construction."
In a line of decisions, culminating in Klein v. Young,3" it was
established that the rights of the tenant's family and guest are
independent of those of the tenant. In Klein v. Young"' the ten-
ant had relieved the landlord of his obligation to repair. Upon
the institution of suit by a lodger who was injured through the
defective condition of the premises the court held that the re-
lease by the tenant did not operate to absolve the landlord of
the liability imposed by Article 2322." This distinction between
27. Brown v. Pons, 147 So. 560 (La. App. 1933). But see Donatt v. Se-
gretta, 161 So. 38 (La. App. 1935); Mosher v. Burglass, 170 So. 416 (La. App.
1936), reinstated 172 So. 124 (La. App. 1937).
28. Glain v. Sparandeo, 119 La. 339, 44 So. 120 (1907).
29. Yates v. Tessier, 5 La. App. 214 (1926).
30. A somewhat similar problem is raised when the defect alleged is
one as to the particular type of construction the landlord has furnished.
Potter v. Soady Bldg. Co., 144 So. 183 (La. App. 1932) (step which gave % of
an inch not a defect); Guidry v. Hamlin, 188 So. 662 (La. App. 1939) (railing
consisting of two horizontal pieces with no vertical pickets not deemed a
defect); Chaix v. Viau, 15 So. (2d) 662 (La. App. 1943) (one board in flooring
% of an inch below level of other flooring not deemed a defect); Golden v.
Katz, 11 So. (2d) 412 (La. App. 1943) (stairs unprovided with a bannister is
not a defect).
31. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
32. Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1926).
33. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
34. 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1926); Hero v. Hankins, 247 Fed. 664 (C. C. A.
5th, 1917); Schoppel v. Daly, 112 La. 201, 36 So. 322 (1904); Gardiner v. De
Salles, 126 So. 739 (La. App. 1930).
35. 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1926).
36. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
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actions arising under Article 232237 and those arising under
Article 269588 has been maintained by the court only for the
purpose of allowing a third person to recover where the tenant
has relieved the owner of responsibility. It has not resulted in
the application of different rules of liability, although the langu-
age used in Article 2322' 9 would indicate that the action should
be based on negligence rather than guaranty. Indirectly the court
has granted third persons the benefits of Article 269540 by apply-
ing the notion, expressed in that article, that the owner is bound
to keep his building safe for its intended use.41 In several cases it
has been deemed unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff
was a tenant or not since he was lawfully on the premises.12
It may be well to note that the liability of Article 232248 is
directed at the owner rather than the lessor, and thus a third
person would have no cause of action against a lessor not the
owner of the building." With the exeption of the ruling in
Klein v. Young,4 5 however, the liability of the owner has been
restricted in much the same manner as that of the lessor. The
same considerations of justice and fair play have led the court
to restrict liability where the plaintiff has been guilty of miscon-
duct,4" or where the tenant was obligated to repair 47 under
Article 2716.48
Act 174 of 1932--
The decision of Klein v. Young 0 that the third person's
cause of action under Article 2322,' was not affected by the ten-
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. Although the wording of the article is subject to both inter-
pretations, it would seem that the court would choose to base liability on
fault, since that is the normal basis of liability for personal injuries.
40. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
41. Thomson v. Cooke, 147 La. 922, 86 So. 332 (1920); Breen v. Waiters,
150 La. 578, 91 So. 50 (1922); Lasyone v. Zenoria Lumber Co., 163 La. 185,
111 So. 670 (1927); Crawford v. Magnolia, 4 So. (2d) 48 (La. App. 1941); Staes
v. Terranova, 4 So. (2d) 453 (La. App. 1941).
42. Allain v. Frigola, 140 La. 982, 74 So. 404 (1917); Pierre v. Levy, 3
La. App. 769 (1926); Wallace v. Meyer, 4 So. (2d) 784 (La. App. 1941); Cole-
man v. Rein, 4 So. (2d) 622 (La. App. 1941).
43. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
44. Duplain v. Wiltz, 194 So. 60 (La. App. 1940).
45. 163 La. 59, Ill So. 495 (1926).
46. Parker v. Kreber, 153 La. 191, 95 So. 601 (1923).
47. Harris v. Tennis, 149 La. 295, 88 So. 912 (1921); Lowe v. Home
Owners' Loan Corp., 199 La. 672, 6 So. (2d) 726 (1942).
48. Louisana Civil Code-of 1870.
49. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6595.
50. 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1926).
51. Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
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ant's contract in which he assumed the obligation of repairing,
was overruled by the legislature in 1932 by an act 5 2 which pro-
vides:
"the owners of buildings or premises which have been leased
under a contract whereby the tenant or occupant assumes re-
sponsibility for the condition of the premises shall not be
liable in damages for injury caused by any vice or defect
therein to any tenant or occupant, nor to anyone in the build-
ing or on the premises by license of the tenant or occupant,
unless the owner knew of such vice or defect, or should within
reason have known thereof, or had received notice of such
vice or defect and failed to remedy same within a reasonable
time thereafter."
This act permits the landlord to relieve himself of liability to
all persons where, as part of the consideration of the lease, the
tenant has assumed responsibility for the condition of the prem-
ises.' 8 It does not grant him the immunity to be expected in a
common law jurisdiction, but instead makes his liability depend-
ent upon whether he knew or should have known of the defect.
When this stipulation is included in the contract, the application
of the statute does much to eliminate the unfairness often mani-
fested by the flat application of the codal articles. It would seem
in this case that the landlord owes only the duty of reasonable
care.8 '
Whether any obligation should be placed on the landlord
is a matter which may well be disputed. Common law courts
have imposed a very limited liability, while at the other extreme
the Louisiana court has been imposing absolute liability. 5 Be-
tween these two positions a middle ground could be selected
52. La. Act 174 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6595].
53. McFlynn v. Crescent Realty Corp. of Del., 160 So. 454 (La. App.
1935); Paul v. Nolen, 166 So. 509 (La. App. 1936); Atkinson v. Stern, 175 So.
126 (La. App. 1937).
54. The act makes the landlord's obligation to repair depend on knowl-
edge of the defect. Notice may be given by the tenant, but the statute
makes another provision by including those defects of which the landlord
should have known. In Mitchal v. Armstrong, 13 So. (2d) 506 (La. App.
1943) the court held where the defendant had conducted an inspection that
he should have known of the defect and a recovery was allowed. In view
of this case perhaps the court will interpret 'should have known of the
defect' as requiring a reasonable inspection by the landlord.
55. For discussion of the common law approach see Harkrider, Tort
Liability of a Landlord (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 260 and Eldredge, Land-
lord's Tort Liability for Disrepair (1936) 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 467.
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whereby the landlord would not be unduly burdened nor the
lessee placed at the mercy of his lessor. The court can achieve
this by considering the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct,
the nature of the repair, and the extent to which the plaintiff has
disqualified himself by his own misconduct-in other words, by
the operation of ordinary principles of negligence. To a certain
extent this has been accomplished in Louisiana, not on the simple
framework of negligence, however, but by the interpretations
placed upon the various codal articles by the court.
JOHN C. MORRIS, JR.
HAZARDOUS BUSINESSES AND EMPLOYMENTS UNDER
THE LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
Today forty-seven of the forty-eight states have workmen's
compensation acts, Mississippi being the only exception. Such
legislation also exists in the territories of Alaska, Hawaii, and
Puerto Rico., Although all workmen's compensation acts seek
to achieve the same result, that is, shifting the basis of liability
for industrial injury from the concept of fault to the more hu-
manitarian premise of industrial responsibility regardless of
fault, the various federal, state, and territorial acts differ widely
in scope and detail of coverage. In this respect the topic of hazar-
dous employments is illustrative. The compensation acts of some
eleven states apply only to hazardous or extra-hazardous em-
ployment.2 The purpose of this type of act is to protect workmen
employed in industries which according to custom and experi-
ence are recognized as threatening greater and more constant
danger of physical injury to their employees than that ordinarily
encountered by the working population at large. The protection
is not against the common uncertainties which affect all walks
of life, but rather against those additional hazards to which a
person is subjected solely on account of the nature of his em-
1. Horovitz, Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws
(1944) 7.
2. Illinois: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 48, § 139; Louisiana: La. Act 20 of
1914, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391]; Maryland: Md. Ann. Code (Bagby,
1924) Art. 101, § 32; Montana: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. (Anderson & McFar-
land, 1935) § 2847; New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 216, § 1; New
Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) c. 57, § 902; New York: N.Y. Workmen's
Compensation Law, § 3; Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. (1938) tit. 85, § 2;
Oregon: Ore. Code Ann. (1930) § 49-1810; Washington: Wash. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 7674; Wyoming: Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Court-
wright, 1931) § 124-102.
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